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AT THE INTERSECTION OF NATIONAL INTERESTS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: WHY AMERICAN INTERESTS
SHOULD ASSUME THE RIGHT OF WAY
CLARK SMITH
ABSTRACT:
Following the interwar period and disastrous results of an isolationist
foreign policy, the United States changed course coming out of the
Second World War. Assuming the global leadership role, the U.S. led
the international effort to design and build the international institutions
and organizations that would ensure and manage the global recovery
from the war that ravaged the world’s economy, deter future wars by
providing checks on and a balance of power, and that would ensure, to
some degree, international systems based on rule of law. Pursuit of
U.S. interests should, when possible, be carried out within that
international legal framework. The U.S. should conform its actions to
international legal norms, so long as it does not create a substantial
departure from pursuit of national interests. In considering ratification
of conventions and treaties in areas of security and human rights, the
U.S. should consider whether ceding sovereignty to unelected
committees charged with monitoring U.S. compliance with the terms of
those agreements is in U.S. interests. On the other hand, ceding
sovereignty as a result of continued global leadership in the
international economic institutions built by the U.S. and its allies may
actually weigh in favor of U.S. interests. Finally, diverging from
traditional international rules when dealing with contemporary
challenges may also be in U.S. interests, particularly when adhering to
values concerning the rule of law that respects human rights. To that
end, the U.S. should consider, with partners when possible, the
evolvement of new norms through action. Justification based on
legitimacy is a valid interest. The U.S. should also rely on national
institutions in managing the conflict between national interests and
international cooperation, but always with the awareness of national
interests.
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“Do you never stop to reflect just what it is that America stands for? If
she stands for one thing more than another, it is for the sovereignty of
self-governing peoples . . .”
- President Woodrow Wilson1

I.

INTRODUCTION

Chief among United States values are the principles of
sovereignty and self-determination, both of which are sacred in the U.S.
system of government and, accordingly, central to U.S. policy interests.
As such, U.S. decisions to enter into international agreements, or
otherwise adhere to international law, should not be made solely in
accordance with commitments to international institutions or
organizations, particularly at the expense of commitments to our own
principles and interests. As an example, certain treaties—such as the
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea Treaty (UNCLOS) and the
U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)—
favored by one or the other political branches might do little to promote
broad U.S. interests and, instead, would risk subjecting the U.S. to
sources of law inconsistent with our principles of government. 2
The Executive, when signing treaties knowing that Senate
support is insufficient, commits the U.S. under international law “to
refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose” of those
treaties.3 Despite such international legal commitment, however, those
1

. Woodrow Wilson, Speech on Military Preparedness at Soldiers’
Memorial Hall, Pittsburgh, PA (Jan. 29, 1916), in Addresses of
President Wilson, UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL SERIAL SET, 11
(1916).
2
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]; United Nations Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRPD]; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (treaties
ratified by the U.S. become the “supreme Law of the Land,” on par
with federal statutes, and the treaty’s terms, or the interpretation of
those terms by a treaty committee, may not conform to either existing
state and federal law or prevalent social, cultural, and economic norms
observed in the U.S.).
3
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (the U.S. has not ratified the treaty but many parts
are considered customary international law); cf. Curtis A. Bradley,
Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution, 48
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treaties have no domestic legal effect. 4 Further, the assertion that the
U.S. should engage broadly in international commitments is
inconsistent with public opinion polls conducted by the Pew Research
Center in December 2013.5
Since the Second World War, the U.S. has exercised global
leadership in the creation and management of international institutions
and organizations built to rehabilitate damaged economies, promote
and sustain economic development and growth, deter war and preserve
peace, and facilitate international cooperation in many other necessary
areas. The growth of those institutions and organizations has been
accompanied by a growth in treaties, conventions, and international
agreements, as well as evolving customary international law.
Some agreements, such as the multilateral North Atlantic
Treaty, have been and continue to be consistent with U.S. interests.6
Others reach a point where they are simply incompatible with U.S.
interests.7 Some conventions appear to the Executive to be in U.S.
HARV. INT’L L.J. 307, 308 (2007) (construing the obligation “as
precluding only actions that would substantially undermine the ability
of the parties to comply with, or benefit from, the treaty after
ratification.”).
4
See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504-05 (2008) (holding that
while a treaty may constitute an international commitment, it is not
binding domestic law without Congressional implementing legislation
or the treaty itself conveys the intention that it be self-executing and
ratified on that basis.); Medellín, 552 U.S. at 525-26 (stating that the
President has an array of political and diplomatic means available to
enforce international obligations, but unilaterally converting a non-selfexecuting treaty into a self-executing one is not among them;
responsibility for transforming international obligation arising from
non-self-executing treaty into domestic law is Congress’s
responsibility.).
5
Pew Research Center, Public Sees U.S. Power Declining as Support
for Global Engagement Slips (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.peoplepress.org/files/legacy-pdf/12-3-13%20APW%20VI%20release.pdf.
6
See generally Jane E. Stromseth, The North Atlantic Treaty and
European Security After the Cold War, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 479
(1991).
7
Douglas J. Ende, Reaccepting the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice: A Proposal for A New United States
Declaration, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1145 (1986).
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interests, but agreement cannot be found in the Senate. 8 And, finally,
some international conventions simply have no political support
regarding U.S. interests.9
This paper argues that international legal instruments and
norms governing international cooperation are not always consistent
with U.S. interests, and that pursuit of U.S. interests should prevail
when inconsistent with those instruments and norms. Following this
introduction, part II of this paper will look at the historical transition in
the first half of the twentieth century from a U.S. isolationist foreign
policy to a fully engaged foreign policy of multilateralism beginning in
the early 1940s. Part II will also look at the role of the U.S. as it
engaged in that policy, including the creation of the U.N. and
associated institutions, and look at the rise of international law
following the Second World War and why states adhered to
international law. While part III looks at some of the threats from the
interpretation, and manipulation, of international law to U.S. interests,
part IV looks at how U.S. political and legal frameworks might coexist
with international law and transform international legal institutions to
better align with U.S. interests.

II.

THE ROLE OF THE U.S. IN THE RISE OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AGREEMENTS AND
INSTITUTIONS
A. Pre-WWII – U.S. Isolationist Policy

Multilateralism has been defined as “international governance
of the ‘many,’” with its principal focus being the “opposition [of]
bilateral and discriminatory arrangements . . . believed to enhance the
leverage of the powerful over the weak and to increase international
conflict.”10 Thus, cooperation among many states is likely to reduce
conflict. But in the early part of the last century starting around 1920-

8

See generally Kevin Walker, Comparing American Disability Laws
to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities with
Respect to Postsecondary Education for Persons with Intellectual
Disabilities, 12 NW. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 115 (2014).
9
See generally David J. Scheffer, The United States and the
International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 12 (1999).
10
Miles Kahler, Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers, 46
INT'L ORG. 681, 681 (1992).
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30’s, U.S. foreign policy was much more akin to an isolationist
policy.11
The U.S. departed briefly from this policy when it declared
war on Germany in 1917, following continued German submarine
attacks on U.S. ships in the North Atlantic. 12 Following the war, and
despite the efforts of President Woodrow Wilson to assume a broader
multilateral role for the U.S. in foreign relations, the U.S. resumed its
isolationist policies when the Senate rejected both the Treaty of
Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations.13 One of the
principal obstacles to achieving the two-thirds consent required by the
Senate was opposition to Article X of the treaty, which, according to
opponents, ceded U.S. war powers, and, thus, elements of U.S.
sovereignty, to the Council of the League of Nations. 14 Thus,
Congressional opponents, fearing consequences of wading into
increasingly complex European affairs likely to result from the peace
treaty, retreated to the habitual aversion to involvement beyond the
confines of the Western Hemisphere.
This aversion to a multilateral approach to foreign relations
following the First World War has been cited as one of the reasons
leading to the rise in German nationalism and, eventually, the Second
World War.15 Prior to hostilities beginning in 1914 and dating back to
the end of the nineteenth century, Britain had been ceding ground to
11

Milestones: 1899–1913, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, BUREAU OF
PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF ST.,
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913 (last visited Mar. 1,
2014).
12
Milestones: 1914–1920, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, BUREAU OF
PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF ST.,
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/wwi (last visited Mar. 1,
2014).
13
See Max Boot, When War Weariness Wears Off, THE WEEKLY
STANDARD (Jan. 20, 2014),
http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/when-war-wearinesswears_774085.html.
14
The League of Nations, 1920, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, BUREAU
OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF ST.,
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/league (last visited Mar.
1, 2014); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
15
See THOMAS OATLEY, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 17-19
(5th ed. 2011).
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Germany, and the U.S., as the main infrastructure of the developing
global economy.16 After the Treaty of Versailles was concluded, and
throughout the decade following the war, Britain and France were
compelled to enforce the debilitating reparations imposed on
Germany.17 This imposition on post-war Germany, without any relief,
can be sourced to U.S. decisions refusing any debt relief for Britain and
France.18 The allies had borrowed heavily from the U.S. to finance
their war efforts and, following the conclusion of hostilities, the U.S.
refused any debt concessions.19 The U.S. further shunned Europe by
restricting the number of immigrants permitted entry into the U.S.
Quotas were introduced in 1921, and by 1929 only 150,000 immigrants
per year were permitted entry into the U.S.20
One result of the lack of cooperation was that Germany’s prewar growing economy was unable to recover and this impacted all of
Europe, if not the U.S. as well.21 Economies of Europe, as well as the
U.S. economy, contracted and instead of cooperative solutions, states
began retreating further into economic isolation via trade barriers
discriminating against foreign markets and favoring, instead, domestic
manufacturers and producers.22 The resulting stock market crash of
1929 and global economic decline fueled German nationalism, paving
the way for the Nazi party’s rise and the century’s second Great War on
the European continent barely twenty years after the end of the first. 23
Around 1940, the momentum for a shift from an isolationist to
a multilateral approach in U.S. foreign relations gathered steam with
recent German military success in Europe being the impetus behind the

16

Id. at 17.
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act), OFFICE OF
THE HISTORIAN, BUREAU OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF ST.,
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/immigration-act (last
visited Mar. 1, 2014).
21
See OATLEY, supra note 15.
22
Id.
23
Milestones: 1937–1945, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, BUREAU OF
PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF ST.,
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945 (last visited Mar. 1,
2014).
17
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shift.24 The U.S. feared not only German military success in Europe,
but also Japanese military success in East Asia, and worried that the
Western Hemisphere could be a subsequent target.25 By July 1941, the
U.S. froze Japanese assets and ceased supporting Japan with oil and
other commodities, and Japan had become heavily dependent upon
those U.S. exports to sustain its imperial ambitions in East Asia. 26
Japan viewed U.S. hegemony in the West, and U.S. assertion of the
Monroe Doctrine, as justification for its own imperial ambitions.
Seeing the U.S. as threatening both Japan’s reputation and economy,
Japan saw itself in a position in which the only choices were war, or
subservience, to the U.S.27 It was not until the attack at Pearl Harbor,
however, that the U.S. finally galvanized for total war, and a permanent
repeal of a primarily isolationist policy.

B. Post-WWII – Transition to a Policy of
Multilateralism
Even before the end of the Second World War, Western
countries agreed on the need to engage in multilateral negotiations.
These negotiations intended to create international agreements and
institutions designed to facilitate the management of historical conflicts
and the rebuilding of war-ravaged countries.28 Many of these new
institutions were economic in nature designed along the premise that

24

Milestones: Lend-Lease and Military Aid to the Allies in the Early
Years of World War II, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, BUREAU OF PUB.
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF ST., http://history.state.gov/milestones/19371945/lend-lease (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
25
Milestones: Japan, China, the United States and the Road to Pearl
Harbor, 1937–41, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, BUREAU OF PUB.
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF ST., http://history.state.gov/milestones/19371945/pearl-harbor (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
26
See Dr. Jeffrey Record, Japan's Decision for War in 1941: Some
Enduring Lessons, STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE (SSI) (Feb. 9, 2009),
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=905.
27
Id.
28
Milestones: Wartime Conferences, 1941–1945, OFFICE OF THE
HISTORIAN, BUREAU OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF ST.,
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/war-time-conferences
(last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
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mutual economic interdependence would be a strong deterrence to
war.29
The architecture of this post-war global economic
interdependent system was created at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire,
and became known as the Bretton Woods Conference.30 The primary
outcomes of Bretton Woods were the establishment of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (World Bank).31
The IMF was designed to monitor balance of payments and
assist in the reconstruction of the global international payment system. 32
Member states contribute to a pool through a quota system from which
states with payment imbalances may temporarily borrow funds.33
Through this and other activities such as monitoring other member
states’ economies and the demand for self-correcting policies, the IMF
improves member states’ economies. 34
The World Bank was responsible for financing and
supervising international reconstruction and development of European
nations devastated by the Second World War.35
After the
reconstruction of Europe, the World Bank advanced global economic
development and poverty eradication efforts. 36
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was
signed later in 1947. The purpose of the GATT, which became the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, was the regulation of
international trade, to include the substantial reduction of barriers to

29

MARGOT HORSPOOL & MATTHEW HUMPHREYS, EUROPEAN UNION
LAW 14 (6th ed. 2012).
30
Milestones: Bretton Woods-GATT, 1941–1947, OFFICE OF THE
HISTORIAN, BUREAU OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF ST.,
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/bretton-woods (last
visited Mar. 1, 2014).
31
Id.
32
See OATLEY, supra note 15, at 214-15; Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do
Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2614 (1997).
33
See OATLEY, supra note 15, at 214.
34
Id.; Koh, supra note 32.
35
See OATLEY, supra note 15, at 300; Koh, supra note 32.
36
See OATLEY, supra note 15, at 300; Koh, supra note 32.
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free trade.37
Regional economic communities reinforced these
multilateral economic organizations, and are governed by their own
international agreement.38

C. The United Nations
The most significant multilateral institution to be created out
of the Second World War was when the U.N. Representatives from the
U.S., Britain, the Soviet Union, and China met in August and
September of 1944 in Washington to create a post-war organization
based on collective security principles.39 Major components of this
new, multilateral, collective security organization included the General
Assembly, represented by all member states, and the Security Council,
represented by only the few remaining major powers following the
Second World War.40
The U.N., a multilateral, international organization, was
officially established on October 24, 1945, to promote international
peace and cooperation.41 The U.N. also created a substantial body of
international law through numerous treaties and conventions. 42 States
bind themselves legally under international law when they become
signatories to the U.N. Charter, as well as various associated treaties
and conventions.43 Now bound under international law, these same
states essentially cede, voluntarily, a portion of their sovereignty by
permitting, in advance, the U.N. to take enforcement action against
them should they violate certain articles of the Charter. 44
37

See OATLEY, supra note 15, at 4.
See Koh, supra note 32.
39
Milestones: The Formation of the United Nations, 1945, OFFICE OF
THE HISTORIAN, BUREAU OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF ST.,
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/un (last visited Mar. 29,
2014).
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
See Role of the United Nations in International Law, 2011 TREATY
EVENT: TOWARDS UNIVERSAL
PARTICIPATION AND IMPLEMENTATION,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/events/2011/Press_kit/fact_sheet_5_e
nglish.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
43
See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
44
See, e.g., U.N. Charter ch. VII.
38
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The U.S. thought the U.N. was capable of success where the
League of Nations was not.45 President Franklin Roosevelt, with the
benefit of hindsight, took a different approach than that of President
Wilson to ensure U.S. Senate support for membership in this global
governing institution.46 President Roosevelt worked for bipartisan
support, in addition to public support, for U.S. membership in a global
organization designed to prevent future wars like those fought in
Europe twice in the past thirty years, as well as in the Pacific. 47
President Roosevelt’s approach garnered overwhelming Senate
approval.48
The lessons learned from the U.S. refusal to accept its global
leadership role following the First World War, corresponding with its
return to an isolationist policy, were key in spurring U.S. policymakers
to action in planning for a new, post-war world order even before the
Second World War was concluded.49 It was clear that the Second
World War was caused, at least in part, by the U.S. refusal to lead a
rebuilding effort for the global economy in the 1920s. 50 But the U.S.
emerged from the Second World War powerful, capable, and willing to
assume a global leadership role. Leading a multilateral effort in
creating the international institutions that would deter future wars, spur
global economic recovery, growth, stability, and promote human
rights.51

D. Why Do Nations Comply with International
Law?
The success of the U.S.-led post-war efforts depended upon
the member states’ commitment, including that of the U.S., to adhering
to the binding legal agreements into which they had entered. Violation
of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, for example, might trigger an
enforcement action designed to compel a member state into

45

See Milestones: The Formation of the United Nations, supra note
39.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
See OATLEY, supra note 15, at 17-18.
50
Id. at 18.
51
Id. at 19.

201

Journal of International Law

compliance.52 But not all violations of the agreements entered into by
states trigger enforcement actions, and so motivation by member states
to comply must lie, at least in part, elsewhere.
Generally, international rules often go unenforced; however,
states still obey those rules nonetheless. 53 This is demonstrated by the
belief on the part of the state that it has a legal obligation to adhere to
the rules (known as opinio juris sive necessitatis).54 Adherence to those
rules has also been attributed to several factors including: the declining
notion of sovereignty; an increase in the number of international
organizations and non-state actors; an increased blurring of the lines
between public and private; the proliferation of treaty-based and
customary rules; and the homogenization of domestic and international
systems.55
During the Cold War, the superpowers’ adherence to
international law, which derived from international organizations,
institutions, and agreements, fell in importance and gave way to
political, as opposed to legal, concepts such as realism. 56 According to
realism, world politics is driven by competitive self-interest and not
constrained by international legal obligations.57 Interstate cooperation
took a back seat to competitive self-interest during this period, until
new entities began crowding the field of international law. 58
The latter part of the twentieth century saw the growth of nonstate actors, such as multinational corporations and international nongovernmental organizations, intersecting legally with states and
compelling greater legal cooperation among states and non-state
actors.59 The collapse of the Soviet Union and the conclusion of the
Cold War seemed to create a further resurgence in international

52

See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
Koh, supra note 32, at 2603 (citing HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS
AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 249-52 (2nd
ed. 1954)).
54
See Alan Watson, An Approach to Customary Law, 1984 U. ILL. L.
REV. 561, 562-63 (1984).
55
See Koh, supra note 32, at 2604.
56
Id. at 2615.
57
See generally JOHN ROURKE, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ON THE
WORLD STAGE (2007).
58
See Koh, supra note 32, at 2624.
59
Id. at 2625.
53
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cooperation.60 In 1991, the U.N. authorized the forcible removal of Iraq
from Kuwaiti territory, and a large multi-national force was cobbled
together for just that task.61 In 1992, members of the European
Community signed the Treaty of Maastricht.62 Thereafter, in 1994, the
U.S., along with its North American partners, concluded the North
American Free Trade Agreement.63 New international law was being
created through multilateral engagement, but challenges to international
cooperation would highlight the difficulties of global legal
governance.64

III.

THE RISING THREAT TO AMERICAN INTERESTS FROM
THE RISING INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. Globalization and the Effects on U.S. Interests
Globalization is a fiercely disputed topic.65 What is not
disputed, however, is that it creates an ever-increasing body of
regulation and corresponding obligations to manage the state-to-state
and state-to-non-state interactions of those seeking to benefit from
globalization.66 For example, conventions such as the UNCLOS and
CRPD are perceived as necessary because of globalization. However,
globalization is not ordered only according to the principles of
international legal agreements.67
Thus, not every international
agreement on a topic pertaining to U.S. interests, whether
globalization-related or not, is seen by the U.S. to be in its interests.68
60

Id. at 2630.
S.C. Res. 678, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
62
Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), July 29, 1992, 1992
O.J. C 191/1.
63
North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289.
64
See Koh, supra note 32, at 2616.
65
See OATLEY, supra note 15, at 346-68.
66
Id. at 358-67.
67
Rafael Domingo, The Crisis of International Law, 42 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1543, 1546 (2009); see generally Ryan Morrow,
Treaties and the Federal Balance in an Era of Globalization, EINTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.eir.info/2011/01/18/treaties-and-the-federal-balance-in-an-era-ofglobalization/.
68
See generally Peter Roff, Kill the Law of the Sea Treaty, U.S. NEWS
(May 10, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/peter61
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Treaties like the UNCLOS and CRPD risk permitting
international officials to set policy in areas intended to be regulated by
the U.S. government, and such treaties risk infringing state
sovereignty.69 For example, UNCLOS empowers a U.N. agency, the
International Seabed Authority, to transfer technology and wealth from
developed to undeveloped nations.70 Thus, on some issues of global
importance, the U.S. elects not to become a signatory by either not
concluding the agreement at all or by the Senate choosing not to grant
consent to the treaty.71 This is not the same as the U.S. neither
observing nor adhering to certain agreements to which the U.S. has
decided not to become a signatory, but instead that the U.S., in
foregoing ratification of the treaty, chooses not to be legally bound
under international law by the specific international agreement. 72

B. Lawfare – An Example of the Effects of
International Law on U.S. Interests
An area in which the ability to address security interests is
being hampered is lawfare.73 The term, “lawfare,” was first used
extensively by Major General Charles Dunlap, the former Deputy

roff/2012/05/10/kill-the-law-of-the-sea-treaty; Stian Reklev, Australia's
opposition backs Kyoto 2, REUTERS (Aug. 16, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/16/us-australia-kyotoidUSBRE87F0A520120816.
69
U.S. Senator Ted Cruz, Limits on the Treaty Power, 127 HARV. L.
REV. F. 93, 94 (2014).
70
Melody Finnemore, Fluid Body of Law from Maritime Statutes of
Old to New Developments in Wave and Tidal Energy, Ocean Law
Continues to Evolve, OR. ST. B. BULL., May 2010, at 19, 23; see also
George F. Will, The LOST sinkhole, WASH. POST (June 22, 2012),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-0622/opinions/35461763_1_royalty-payments-reagan-adviser-sea-treaty.
71
See Roff, supra note 68; see generally Reklev, supra note 68.
72
See e.g., CRPD, supra note 2.
73
See Sebastian Gorka, Briefing: White House Review Threatens
Counter-Terrorism Operations, THE LAWFARE PROJECT (Dec. 5, 2011),
available at http://www.thelawfareproject.org/summary-of-whitehouse-review-briefing.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2014) (summarizing
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Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Air Force.74 Dunlap defines
lawfare “as the strategy of using—or misusing—law as a substitute for
traditional military means to achieve an operational objective.” 75 As
such, the term can be used for positive and negative purposes. 76 More
often, and more recently, the term is used as a label to criticize those
who manipulate international law, legal proceedings, and judicial
systems to make claims against the state, especially in areas related to
strategic military and political goals.77
While the term is controversial, the increased use of the
concept is undeniable.78 Lawfare is often used as a weapon in
asymmetrical warfare by guerrillas or terrorists against larger nations
where the rule of law is developed.79 As an example, lawfare can be the
exploitation of actual or orchestrated violations of the Law of Armed
Conflict by non-state enemy combatants as a strategy to counter the
effectiveness of a superior armed force. 80 Israel is a frequent target of
lawfare, as noted by legal scholar Anne Herzberg. She writes that the
detractors of the Jewish state are increasingly using
civil lawsuits and criminal investigations around the
world to tie Israel's hands against Palestinian terror
by accusing Jerusalem of “war crimes” and “crimes
against humanity.” In the process, the NGOs also
subvert and interfere with the diplomatic relations of
74

Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today: A Perspective, 3 YALE J.
INT'L AFF. 146, 146 (2008).
75
Id.
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Id. at 147.
77
Brooke Goldstein & Benjamin Ryberg, The Emerging Face of
Lawfare: Legal Maneuvering Designed to Hinder the Exposure of
Terrorism and Terror Financing, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 634, 637
(2013).
78
See generally David Scheffer, Whose Lawfare Is It, Anyway?, 43
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 215 (2010).
79
See Nathaniel Burney, International Law: a Brief Primer, THE
BURNEY LAW FIRM, LLC,
http://www.burneylawfirm.com/international_law_primer (last visited
Mar. 2, 2014).
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See Maj. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., Lawfare amid warfare, WASH.
TIMES (Aug. 3, 2007),
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Western countries with Israel.
These lawsuits
typically ignore the difficulty Israel faces in fighting
terrorists who target Israeli civilians while hiding
among their own civilian populations.
The
accusations also ignore the measures Israel takes to
avoid civilian casualties, including the strictest rules
of engagement for any Western army. While Israel is
not the only country that has been subject to this sort
of lawfare – several prominent NGOs have filed
similar suits against U.S. officials in France and
Germany – it is a primary target.81
Lawfare can also include frivolous lawsuits against journalists
and politicians who speak publicly about issues of national security.82
In 2005, for example, the Islamic Society of Boston filed a defamation
lawsuit against seventeen media defendants for speaking publicly about
the Society's alleged connections to radical Islam and for commenting
critically on the construction of the Society's Saudi-funded Boston
mosque.83 Eventually, the suit was dismissed.84
Misuse of legal terminology to influence public opinion is also
considered lawfare.85 As an example, the U.N. has passed a Resolution
on Combating Defamation of Religions nearly every year since 1999. 86
There are claims that the Resolution is a political attempt to stifle any
criticism of Islam and, in turn, free speech. 87 But international law
81
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Susan W. Tiefenbrun, Semiotic Definition of “Lawfare”, 43 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 29, 53 (2010).
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See Global Relief Found., Inc. v. New York Times Co., 2003 WL
403135 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2003).
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Global Relief Found., Inc. v. New York Times Co., 390 F.3d 973,
990 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming district court decision “to enter summary
judgment in favor of the defendants because their reports about GRF
were substantially true.”).
85
See Tiefenbrun, supra note 82, at 56.
86
See Robert Evans, Islamic bloc drops U.N. drive on defaming
religion, REUTERS (Mar. 25, 2011),
http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/03/24/idINIndia-55861720110324.
87
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attorney Elisabeth Samson argues that defamation of a religion is a
legal impossibility, and thus a form of lawfare.88 A religion is not a
““person, business, group or government,” all of which are tangible
entities required by the legal definition of defamation.” 89 Instead,
religion is a set of beliefs.90 U.S. recognition of such a resolution would
not be compatible with the First Amendment, which provides that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” 91
Further, “the hallmark of the protection of free speech is to allow ‘free
trade in ideas’—even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people
might find distasteful or discomforting.”92
Exploitation of universal jurisdiction laws has been labeled
lawfare as well.93 Cited examples include: Jordan's extradition demand
for a Dutch politician to stand trial for blasphemy of Islam, Belgium's
attempted prosecution of former U.S. President George Bush and
British Prime Minister Tony Blair for war crimes, and a South African
legal organization’s call for U.S. President Barack Obama’s indictment
for crimes against humanity and genocide.94 Of course, not all lawsuits
similar to the types discussed are acts of lawfare. But manipulation of
Western court systems, use of Western “hate speech laws,” and other
products of political correctness employed to harm democratic
principles are unsupportable.95
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E. Ceding American Sovereignty
6. The Threat to U.S. Democracy from
Global Governance
Sovereignty is a concept viewed quite differently among
different states.96 For example, the U.S. is quite principled with regards
to sovereignty while European states are willing to cede sovereignty in
many areas.97 The European Union (EU) has developed a new body of
international economic law and permitted individual European states,
by ceding parts of their national sovereignty, to achieve economies of
scale in negotiations with non-EU states.98 This, in turn, has improved
their negotiation positions with other states.99 Whatever the criticism of
the individual European states’ ceding of national sovereignty through
the EU, it has demonstrated some success for many EU states in areas
of economic growth despite the turmoil from the global economic
downturn beginning in 2008.100
But where the EU may benefit from the imposition on their
individual states’ democratic processes of supranational or international
law, the U.S. would not. Whether international law derives from
decisions of courts addressing international issues or from rules and
regulations of international organizations like those created in the
aftermath of the Second World War, both have implications for a
democratic state in that both may impose legal outcomes without the
direct involvement of the democratic state’s lawmaking functionaries.101
In the case of law deriving from court decisions, there is no
involvement of a state’s popular decision-making process.102 On the
96

See Robert O. Keohane, Ironies of Sovereignty: The European
Union and the United States, 40 JCMS: J. OF COMMON MARKET STUD.,
743, 744-46 (2002).
97
Id.; see also Alex Newman, The EU: Regionalization Trumps
Sovereignty, THE NEW AMERICAN (Aug. 20, 2013),
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100
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101
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other hand, law created by the establishment of international
organizations permits some limited role for the U.S. executive and
legislative branches in drafting the details of the agreement to which
the U.S. will accede.103 In turn, each branch has a say in crafting the
impending legislation, assuming necessity, to determine how
international law will become domestic law. 104 Further, both branches
may agree to withdraw the U.S. from its commitment should that
commitment be considered no longer consistent with U.S. interests. 105
While checks on the latter may afford the U.S. greater flexibility than
on the former, checks on international law created by international
organizations are not necessarily sufficient.106

7. Use of Force
Decisions concerning whether to threaten or actually use
military force are among the most, if not the most, important decisions
a state considers. Limiting a state’s authority for those decisions by
subjecting them to a supranational authoritative source diminishes a
state’s sovereignty.107 Of course an entirely unilateral, non-coalition
use of force extraterritorially by a state for reasons based solely on
national self-interest should never be justified or permitted by the
international community. But just because international officials and
legal scholars invoke the U.N. Charter as rationale for the illegality of
the use of force does not make the action illegitimate or even
impermissible.108
In March 1999, air forces from member states of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began bombing targets in the
former Yugoslavia in order to end widespread violations of
international law perpetrated by Serbian military and police forces
against Kosovar Albanians.109 Because the U.N. Security Council
action did not sanction the NATO action, many legal observers
103
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109
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considered the action a violation of the U.N. Charter. 110 But attempt by
the U.N. Security Council to instead condemn the action was actually
defeated by a wide margin.111 NATO member states found justification
in the action. The U.S. concluded the action was justified based on
excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian forces, pending
actions by Serbian forces targeting Kosovar Albanians, and the threat to
the wider region including Albania, Macedonia, and NATO allies
Greece and Turkey.112 Britain also found legal justification in that force
is permissible in extreme circumstances in order to prevent a pending
humanitarian atrocity.113

8. International Criminal Court
Another international legal instrument that risked ceding U.S.
sovereignty was the International Criminal Court (ICC). 114 Initially
supportive of the ICC, the U.S. ultimately renounced its signature of
the treaty.115 U.S. personnel would have come under the jurisdiction of
the ICC if either the U.S. ratified the treaty or if U.S. personnel
engaged in conduct determined by the ICC to be under their criminal
jurisdiction and occurring within the territory of a state party to the

110
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treaty.116 The risk to U.S. sovereignty is the transfer of authority to
make law to an international institution. 117 The ICC can expand the
definition of offenses covered under the statute by gaining the approval
of only two-thirds of the states party to the treaty. 118 Additionally, some
descriptions of crimes covered under the statute may not be interpreted
uniformly and, therefore, permit the ICC to conclude its own
jurisdiction through such non-uniform interpretation.119

9. Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (CRPD)
The CRPD, signed by the Executive and awaiting the advice
and consent of the Senate, is intended to protect the rights and dignity
of persons with disabilities.120 From a public diplomacy perspective, it
is presumed that the U.S. would boost its global reputation by holding
itself to high human rights standard. However, acceding to the treaty,
without reservations, would risk ceding authority to an international
committee of appointed experts from, potentially, countries with
questionable human rights records.121 Similar human rights treaties
often establish such a committee of experts to periodically review
implementation of the treaty by the parties. These committees,
however, are not democratically elected, but instead appointed by state
parties to the treaty, regardless of their human rights record.
With regards to the CRPD, the committee “shall make such
suggestions and general recommendations on the report as it may
consider appropriate . . . and may request further information from
States Parties relevant to the implementation of the present
Convention.”122 Such recommendations may not be consistent with
U.S. cultural, social, economic, and legal traditions and norms. More
important, with regards to U.S. interests and persons, the U.S. already
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has ample domestic laws protecting the rights of disabled individuals. 123
Additionally, numerous federal agencies are also charged with
protecting those rights.124
Thus, affected U.S. persons would
experience no discernible benefit from U.S. accession to this treaty.

IV.

HOW PRIORITIZING AMERICAN INTERESTS MIGHT
COEXIST WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW

That international law, including customary international law,
treaties, conventions, and other international agreements, cannot
coexist with U.S. interests is inaccurate. The U.S. has provided global
leadership since the Second World War and it would run counter to
U.S. interests to disengage from existing and beneficial international
legal institutions and obligations and risk losing that global leadership
role. There are several areas in which U.S. interests can facilitate the
transformation of international law.

A. Intervention Based on Legitimacy, Not Just
Legality
The 1999 NATO Kosovo action was condemned by several
states, including two of the five permanent Security Council members,
as being illegal.125 However, the U.S. and its NATO allies, in using
military force to halt the indiscriminate and excessive use of force by
the Serbian military and paramilitary forces, acted on legitimate
grounds.126 Following the Kosovo intervention, international legal
scholar Antonio Cassese suggested that “under certain strict conditions
resort to armed force may gradually become justified, even absent any
123
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authorization by the Security Council.”127
lawyer Celeste Poltak notes that:

Indeed, international

while the terms of the Charter seem clear, in that
Article 2(4) contains an absolute prohibition on the
use of force, Article 2(4) may nevertheless lend itself
to a narrow exception. The idea that the wellfounded prohibition on the use of force is capable of
exception in cases of extreme humanitarian need is
consistent with: the principles of interpretation
applicable to constituent documents; the evolution of
the human rights paradigm at international law; and
the evolving notion of a “threat to the peace.” While
the core prohibition on the use of force remains as
relevant in the twenty-first century as it did in 1945
when the Charter first came into force in order to
preserve a stable global order, the international
context in which the prohibition was first articulated
has changed.128
Poltak further indicates that the long-term flexibility of a:
treaty rests largely on its ability to adapt to the
changing needs of the context in which it functions”
and that excising “a restrictive exception to the
prohibition on the use of force in cases of
humanitarian catastrophes involving the large scale
loss of life is consistent with the overarching goals
and purposes of the Charter and contemporary
international law.129
In 2001, the Canadian government presented to the U.N.
General Assembly findings from research regarding ways to protect
vulnerable populations in a manner that could be considered legitimate,
127
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and thus legal.130 The doctrine is referred to as the Responsibility to
Protect, or R2P, and emphasizes prevention of manmade humanitarian
catastrophes, reaction to those catastrophes when they do arise, and
rebuilding following any necessary intervention. 131 The R2P report lists
six criteria legitimizing intervention, despite claims of illegality, in
such circumstances: appropriate authority, just cause, appropriate
intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospects for
success.132
Despite this framework proposing the legitimization of
intervention into the territory of another state for purposes of abating a
state-made humanitarian crisis, the international community failed to
intervene into the Darfur region of Sudan after 2003 when Arab militias
began an ethnic cleansing campaign against non-Arab Sudanese in the
region. Unfortunately, continued arguments to the contrary emphasize
that any intervention, including on humanitarian grounds, is
permissible “only in self defense or in actions authorized by the
Security Council.”133
Darfur was an example where R2P provided both justification
and authority for intervention on humanitarian grounds. Additionally,
the U.N. Charter could have been cited as facilitating intervention
under R2P by permitting U.N. Members to take action to achieve
universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms without
distinction to race or religion.134 Further, a combined intervention in
Darfur would have served not only humanitarian interests, but regional
security interests as well.135
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Syria is another example of where a sovereign state leader
harmed his own people. President Barack Obama laid out the
justification, under both domestic and international law, for
intervention in Syria in September 2013, but ultimately elected not to
do so.136 Some legal experts agreed that President Obama would have
violated both domestic and international law had he intervened. 137 But
the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel has argued on prior
occasions that the credibility of the U.N. Security Council is in U.S.
interests and, therefore, can justify the President’s authority to use
military force absent prior authorization from Congress. 138 Under
international law, the U.S. and coalition partners could have cited the
doctrine of R2P, building upon the purposes of the Kosovo intervention
and pushing the boundaries for a new, and necessary, international
norm.

B. Working within National Institutions and
Transforming International Institutions
U.S. interests can also better coexist within the international
legal structure if the U.S. better utilizes existing national institutions
and works to transform international institutions.

10. Sovereignty and International Cooperation
By cooperating internationally, in international trade and
capital markets for example, the U.S. does necessarily—and
appropriately—cede some control of its domestic economy to

136
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international organizations.139 The “international law” created by these
international organizations does restrict the U.S. in its ability to carry
out preferred domestic policy choices. 140 But effecting transformation
of those international institutions needs to take place within the context
of the U.S. Constitution, ensuring no risk to sovereignty is ceded
unnecessarily.
The Supremacy Clause provides that the “Constitution . . .
shall be the supreme Law of the Land,” followed by “the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States.”141 Therefore, participation in the international economic legal
order, for example, necessarily takes place within the U.S.
Constitution’s system of politics and laws.142 The “sovereignty of selfgoverning peoples” is flexible.143 According to legal scholars Julian Ku
and John Yoo, sovereignty of self-governing peoples:
does not undermine the Constitution's allocation of
powers or its guarantees of individual rights. Indeed,
139
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popular sovereignty already assumes that the U.S.
government operates under substantial and
fundamental constraints within its territory. The U.S.
cannot fully control external constraints on its
sovereignty ... but it can restrict legal limits on its
sovereignty by international organizations and
multilateral treaties by withholding its consent to
international regimes.144
International trade and collective action necessitate
international cooperation.
Resolving conflict that arises from
international cooperative efforts by looking first to international law
that trumps national sovereignty is not consistent with U.S. interests or
the Constitution.145
However, the structural provisions of the
Constitution do permit the coexistence of international legal institutions
and U.S. political and legal institutions so that the U.S. may realize the
benefits of international cooperation.146

11. Transforming the U.N. to Align with U.S.
Interests
It remains in U.S. interests to assist with the transformation of
international institutions, most importantly the U.N. The U.S. must
engage its allies to shape the institutions to conform to U.S. interests
when mutual, just as it did following the Second World War.147 The
U.N. itself has advocated for transformational reform. 148 Some of the
more important proposals, cited by legal scholar Anne-Marie Slaughter,
in the 2004 U.N. report included: adding human security to state
security in the context of international peace and security; adopting the
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R2P doctrine; and reforming the Security Council. 149 Each brings its
own challenges, and unsurprisingly, none have been officially adopted
by the U.N.
The addition of human security, which refers to security of the
individual from such dangers as disease, violence, or violation of
individual rights, to state security shifts the emphasis of traditional
security policy. Human security emphasizes a non-coercive approach
to security that is incompatible with traditional security policies of
deterring and addressing foreign aggression. 150 But human security,
like the doctrine of R2P, is viewed differently between developed and
developing countries. Similar to R2P, effective reform efforts would
create a framework to permit intervention to promote human security
when the subject country lacks the capacity, or will, to secure their own
population.151 Reform of the Security Council is equally challenging.
And although some experts believe the Security Council is destined for
irrelevance without reform, what such reform might bring remains
unforeseeable.152 On the subject of reform through enlargement, the
U.S. is seen by some as “ambivalent” due, in part, to concern over
whether new members would accept policies consistent with U.S.
interests.153 However, in 2004, the U.S. Congress also established a
task force for the purpose of recommending measures designed to make
the U.N. more effective in realizing the goals of the Charter.154 The
U.S. report identified several areas consistent with both U.S. and U.N.
149
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interests: (1) legitimacy, as the one place where countries can debate as
equals; (2) diplomatic offices, for mediation and similar third-party
assistance in brokering disputes; (3) special expertise, in areas such as
election preparations and assistance with displaced persons; and (4)
leverage, in areas such as preventing national rivalries from impairing
humanitarian efforts.155
Additionally, the U.S. agenda for proposed U.N. reform
included: (1) institutional reforms; (2) specific steps to improve U.N.
effectiveness in counter-terrorism and trafficking of weapons of mass
destruction; (3) specific steps to prevent genocide and other human
rights violations; (4) poverty eradication and political, legal, and
economic infrastructure development; and (5) increased capacity in
peacekeeping operations.156 The task force recommended neither
reforms requiring revisions to the Charter nor expansion of the Security
Council.157 What these reports do highlight, however, are areas where
the U.S. can remain committed internationally while leading the
transformation effort of an international institution and ensuring the end
state is consistent with U.S. interests and law.

V.

CONCLUSION

It is certainly not in the U.S. interest to disengage from
existing international commitments. However, it is equally unadvisable
to submit further to international agreements that advance no
substantive U.S. interests beyond, for example, promoting public
diplomacy.
Where the U.S. remains a party to multilateral international
agreements that have become wholly incompatible with U.S. interests,
the U.S. should take action to withdraw from such agreements.158 And
155

Id. at 3.
Id. at 6-7.
157
Id. at 7.
158
See generally Ilene R. Cohn, Nicaragua v. United States: Pre-Seisin
Reciprocity and the Race to the Hague, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 699 (1985)
(exploring the consequences the U.S. faced in disagreeing with the
assertion that the International Court of Justice held jurisdiction); John
Quigley, The United States' Withdrawal from International Court of
Justice Jurisdiction in Consular Cases: Reasons and Consequences, 19
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 263 (2009) (discussing the controversy
regarding the withdrawal as well as arguing for a reconstruction of U.S.
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where the U.S. remains a party to those agreements that appear,
perhaps, less consistent with U.S. interests, the U.S. should mobilize
efforts to transform such institutions. 159
To that end, the U.S. should look, with partners whenever
possible, to create new norms. Justification based on legitimacy, when
legality is questionable under traditional criteria, should not be avoided.
The U.S. should also use national institutions to manage the conflicts
between national interests and international cooperation, but always in
a manner consistent with the U.S. Constitution and always with a
tendency towards national interests.

international policy).
159
See Report of the Task Force on the United Nations, supra note
154, at 5.
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